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Michael S. Dukakis

Michael S. Dukakis, a Democrat, was the governor of Massachusetts from 1975 to 1979 and again from 1983 to 1991. He was the Democratic presidential nominee in 1988. Since 1991, Dukakis has been a professor of political science at Northeastern University in Boston and a visiting professor at UCLA’s School of Public Policy & Social Research.

John W. Mashek interviewed Dukakis on September 10, 2007.

In 1988 it was practically a free-for-all in both parties, with many candidates on both sides. Do you think that money-raising was critical on your side as well as the Republican side, where [George H.W.] Bush, of course, had, as the sitting vice president, a big jump on [Jack] Kemp and [Bob] Dole and [Pat] Robertson and the rest of the field?

Well, certainly important enough so that all of us who were running wanted a good financial base that could help to pay for the campaign. And I was fortunate enough to be able to; I think I raised more money than anybody else. From a very broad base of people, I think I ended up with something like 400,000 individual contributors in that campaign, which is the way I had always done my fundraising. So we were fortunate enough to be able to do that. And I never had a money problem in the campaign.

And then both Vice President Bush and I accepted federal funding, so that, in the final, we had that. But then I was introduced to the wonders of federal campaign finance, including all of this other stuff that you could still raise money for. So I guess neither one of us ever stopped raising money. But certainly, during the primary period, it was that very broad base of relatively small contributors. I mean, I think our average contribution was 75 bucks or something. But a very broad base provided the bulk of our funds and with the federal match. And so I literally never had a money problem in the primary.

In that race, of course, it would seem so topsy-turvy, because of his showing in ’84, Gary Hart was considered the front-runner and . . .

Right, right. He was the front-runner.

Then he had problems, as we know. And then [Dick] Gephardt, because he was in the House, and he was out very early. And Joe Biden was out. And one thing that rather intrigued me, you did pretty well in Iowa and then just slaughtered the rest of them in New Hampshire.

Yes.

And although [Al] Gore was hanging in on Super Tuesday, you certainly made a couple of strong showings in large states. And it seemed to me, as just an observer then, that everybody was pretty much out of it then. They stayed in.

Not quite. Look, we had a strategy from the beginning, which was that I wanted to do well in Iowa.

Which you did.

Which I was fortunate enough to do. I spent 85 campaign days in the state of Iowa. John Sasso said, “You are going to have to spend 65 campaign days in the state of Iowa.” And I said to John, “If you tell me I have got to do 65, well, it turned out it was 85.” And I did it mostly on weekends, because I was in the state Monday through Thursday trying to run my state.

Of course, New Hampshire was easier, because going to New Hampshire was like going to Worcester. I mean, I could be up there and back at night and all that kind of stuff. And look, if a Massachusetts candidate can’t win in New Hampshire, then your chances [are not good]. But then, from the beginning, on Super Tuesday — I remember that was the first Super Tuesday — we wanted to win at the corners. We wanted to win Maryland, Florida, Texas, and Washington. We also wanted to win a few others. But I mean those are the four key states.

So I had some of my best political organizers in those states as early as the spring of ’87. I had two of them in Florida, one in Texas, one in Maryland, one in Washington. And we just went at it in those four states. And I was fortunate enough to win in all four states.

Then I went to Illinois. I got my head handed to me by Paul Simon and [Jesse] Jackson, which was quite disappointing. I mean, I don’t think I got more than 7 percent or 8 percent of the vote in Illinois. And we had worked hard in Illinois. But I was running against a couple of locals. Even so, that was disappointing. I mean, I had hoped I could do what I had done in Iowa, which was to be a close third to the two of them.

Then we went to Michigan, in case you had forgotten. Remember that firehouse primary? I was ahead in the polls by about 15 points and all that kind of stuff in Michigan. And Jesse beat me in Michigan, which was really disappointing. Then we went to Wisconsin. There I won. And Dick and Paul, I think, dropped out after Wisconsin. So by the time we got to New York, it was Jesse, myself, and Al Gore. And it was pretty clear if I could beat Gore in New York, we’d pretty much clinch it. And we did.

Oh, that was the famous Gore cave, as we all remember.

Yes, yes. Well, it was just tough. The wrong people advising him. But there was a slump there after Super Tuesday. I mean there was a bit of a slump in Illinois, and then this Michigan thing, which really knocked us over.

Is that a big union vote? I am trying to recall.

Well, you remember it wasn’t a regular primary. They had them in places where they normally didn’t have primaries. Jesse got a big minority vote out. I don’t know quite what happened. All I know is that we were sailing in there, and at least in the state polls up in double digits. And I lost it. So that was not exactly my best day. But I kind of recovered in Wisconsin. And when Paul and Dick dropped out before New York then I . . .

I remember in Wisconsin being there for a week. And there were some predictions that Jackson was getting big crowds at the university. But I think he won by 10 or 12 or maybe more points.

Yeah, it was a pretty good-sized victory. And I had another one of my best coordinators in there. So we had some very good people in place, and they had been there for months long before.

Well, I remember talking to Bob Farmer both during the campaign and even since; he was an enthusiastic money-raiser and was enthused about you. And I think it takes that. And now, just to kind of transpose to today — where, as you know, more money is being raised than you can shake a fist at — it seems like more of a job to people. And you don’t know about the dedication. Now maybe that’s just my thinking.

Well, I don’t know enough about fundraising inside to be able to tell you. I mean, my sense is that, at this point — although Hillary [Clinton], I think, has done a fine job raising money — it’s [Barack] Obama that’s kind of doing what I tried to do in ’87 and ’88, which is to raise money from as broad a base as possible. He’s been able to do that. Now as you will hear me say more times than you care to hear, what I don’t understand about Barack and his people is that — I mean he must have 300,000 contributors — they are not turning them into precinct people, which I don’t understand.

That, of course, we tried to. If you sent me 50 bucks, first thing we tried to do is get you into the primary organization at the grass roots. And that’s the way I had always done my stuff. Now why we kind of abandoned any effective precinct-based grass-roots organization in the final is beyond me. It was one of the thousands and thousands of mistakes I made. And maybe it’s one of the reasons I’m so obsessive about this stuff now.

And then in your race against Bush and [Dan] Quayle, you were certainly bombarded with negative ads.

Attack stuff. Well, one big mistake, obviously, was in not being ready for that and having a strategy to deal with it. But I think another big mistake, in retrospect, was that a lot of the really effective grass-roots stuff that we had done in the primary we kind of abandoned in the final. And don’t ask me why. I mean it’s the final elections. You don’t do grass-roots stuff? I don’t know. But believe me, in retrospect it was a terrible mistake.

And I don’t want to see my party make it again. I mean, it’s one of the reasons I’m working with Howard Dean and his new political director to see if we can start, literally, organizing every one of the 200,000 precincts in the country. I mean, I don’t see any reason why we can’t do that. Precinct captains, block captains, the whole nine yards.

But to go back to the fundraising side of things, one of the things that you want to do if you are engaged in a broad-based fundraising effort, where you are trying to raise your money from as broad a base as possible, is not only to get those $50s and the $100s, but to turn those people into precinct and block captains immediately. As soon as the contribution comes in, bingo — “Thanks, and will you be a precinct captain?” And that is not happening, to the best of my knowledge, in any of the current campaigns. And I don’t understand why.

I think it’s true with [John] Edwards in Iowa. But he is just throwing everything into that state. And if he loses there, why . . .

Yeah. And they are all doing this in Iowa and New Hampshire. But it’s fueled, primarily, by kids. Nothing against kids; I used to be a kid once myself. But it’s one of these things where as soon as the primary is over, bingo, the organization dissolves. That’s not what I am talking about. New Hampshire has 500 precincts. Every one of those precincts ought to have a precinct captain who is a New Hampshire person who comes from that community. I mean, that’s the way; so that when the primary is over, those folks just never stop working toward the final.

And, of course, New Hampshire is changing now. I mean [Senator John] Sununu is in danger.

Yeah. You know what happens; I mean, the latest polls have it down by 25.

But you know what happened at the state level [in 2006]? I mean, they not only reelected a popular Democratic governor, they replaced 75 Republican state legislators. But the standard kind of consultant-driven thing is that you send in dozens of paid young people and interns. And they get on the phone and start calling people every week, every two weeks, incessantly. Well, for one thing, phones don’t work very well. I mean, they are not effective, less so as time goes on. And secondly, people are sick of them. 

The thing that makes a difference, the reason this guy is now governor in this state [John Lynch] and won by 21 percentage points, is because he organized every one of 2,157 precincts in the state with local folks that walk like the precinct, talk like the precinct, and look like the precinct. And I think that’s what we got to do. The DNC [Democratic National Committee] has five million contributors. We have 200,000 precincts. [It] shouldn’t be difficult to turn that five million contributor base into the best damn grass-roots organization the country has ever seen.

Well, I think they are actually trying to do that.

Yes, they are.

I think there is an effort going on.

Yeah. No, Howard Dean gets it. But just between us, I don’t see a lot of evidence that, at this point, the candidates themselves are doing this — are seriously working, organizing, at the precinct level.

And I don’t mean just in Iowa and New Hampshire. I mean in New York. I mean in California. You have got a flock of, what is it, the first 20 primaries that may very well have an impact on that.

Well, your campaign in ’88 was, of course, before Howard Dean and others discovered the charm of the Internet.

Yeah. Well, we didn’t have it.

And I think, if my memory serves me right, that while there is some direct mail, that Bob Farmer and others were really appealing directly to people.

Yeah, a lot of it, right.

I mean, they would get groups together. A lunch with Governor Dukakis or something like that.

Right, right, right.

Are you amazed that this Internet has become the main weapon now?

Well, it’s a terrific organizing tool, both with respect to fundraising and precinct-based organizing. And it doesn’t cost anything. I mean, that’s the incredible thing about it. You don’t even have to pay for literature anymore. It’s all on the machine. All your precinct people have to do is buy paper. I am serious.

You can get them their voting lists. You can train them. You can call meetings. I mean, all of this kind of stuff. We had to spend good money on postage, telephones, all that kind of stuff. Don’t need it anymore. So initially it’s a great way to raise money, which both [John] McCain and Dean showed us. But what I want this party of mine to do is to take it the next step. And that is to turn those contributors into precinct workers. And you can do that through the Internet very effectively.

Well, I know you are not privy to what’s going on in the Republican side, but I sense this year that [Mitt] Romney may be doing that more than even [Rudy] Giuliani or all the other candidates.

Maybe. I just don’t know. He never did it here, by the way. Romney never did it here.

The negative ads — every poll that’s taken, and you are aware of this — all of the people say, “We don’t like them.” They obviously work, or consultants just wouldn’t just pour money into them.

Sure they do. Yes.

And, of course, you were victimized by the so-called independent expenditures. And [George H.W.] Bush said he had nothing to do with it. We all sense that [Lee] Atwater was deeply involved.

Yeah, and the same with the Swift Boat thing [in 2004].

Here is the reason for asking that. After February 5, we are almost sure to know who the two nominees are going to be, and then there is going to be a hiatus of five or six months before the conventions in Denver and Minneapolis. And, I daresay, that is going to be a period of what they commonly call now “profiling the opponent.” And we all know what that means. Is it your guess or your prediction that we are going to be in for five months of pretty tough going on both sides?

I am afraid so. Now what do you do about it if you are the object of these attacks? Well, you certainly don’t sit there mute as I did. I think you have to anticipate them. You have to come up with a carefully thought out strategy for dealing with them, one of which makes it impossible for your opponent to refuse to take responsibility for the so-called independent-committee stuff.

It’s easy to say in retrospect. And [John] Kerry and his campaign did not remain mute, as I did, in the face of those Swift Boat attacks. But with the benefit of hindsight, I think what you have to do is, if they start with this stuff, you have to do everything you can to pin responsibility for it on your opponent and not let him get with the dodge that it’s an independent expenditure. I mean, hey, Ben Ginsberg was counsel to the Swift Boat people, right? I mean, who is kidding whom? When [Karl] Rove was asked what about it, he said, “I am not going there.” What does that mean? I mean, we all know what was going on.

And I think, again, I am the last guy in the world to advise anybody, given what happened to me. But I think with the benefit of hindsight, my advice to John [Kerry] would have been, you put responsibility for those attacks right squarely in the lap of George W. Bush and don’t let him up until he acknowledges it and calls them off. I mean, you cannot let this game be played in a way that hurts you. That’s all.

We who are prognosticating the whole thing could be wrong that the debates this year could be even more important than ever before. Because we could have candidates that aren’t exactly — a lot of people don’t pay as close attention as you and I. And I know that Paul [Kirk] and Frank Fahrenkopf are pretty convinced that the two candidates will agree to three and one.

Three debates. Yeah.

Is it your feeling that no matter who is in the race, that these really could be pivotal this year? Or that it’s just we in the press like to say how important they are?

No, I think they are important. I don’t know. I’m still not quite sure how your ability to turn a quick phrase in a debate relates to your ability to run the country. But nevertheless, I think people expect them. And I think they will play an important role.

Getting to the money thing: When you went in for a debate prep and arrived in the cities beforehand to debate Bush, did you have to invest a lot of money in getting the whole crew there early? Or was it obviously worth the while?

No, no. And in point of fact, I overprepared. If I had to do it over again, I would have done much less. I mean, I was just getting very stale by that time. Just in terms of how many, we had, what, 45 scheduled debates on the primary? I made 39 of them. And you have been on the trail, saying the same thing over and over and over again. And I would have done much less the second time around. I was just getting stale, that’s all.

Well, let’s fast-forward for a few minutes, to today. Do you think that we have probably seen either the end of public financing for, perhaps, every candidate but McCain now? Or if at least it’s not the end, it’s on life support?

Well, it’s certainly on life support. And I regret that. Because — not that we didn’t go out and have other ways to raise money, which we both did — I thought that it was a liberating experience to be able to get matching [funds] during the primary and then to have a pretty substantial chunk of money to spend on the final. And it certainly took a lot of the pressure off.

So when Farmer came to me and said, “Well, now you have got to go out and start raising money for the final,” I said: “What are you talking about? That’s all federal.” He said, “Oh, no, no, there is this other thing.” And I said, “What are you talking about?” And he said, “Well, there is this [soft money].” And I said to Farmer: “Well, we are not doing that, Bob. We are just not doing it. I mean, I don’t believe in it.” And he said: “Well, OK. You can do that. But the other guy is going to raise $50 million.”

So I finally said: “Jesus, I mean this is crazy. I thought we had ended this stuff.” So then I said: “OK. We are going to have some rules. No corporations. We are going to have a maximum.” All this kind of stuff. But we still had to get down that road, unfortunately.

But I will say this to you: I think the fact that there was federal matching and subsequently federal funding in the final was a big plus. And I am just not happy about the fact. The other thing is, again, I am back to my theme here: If you do the precinct-based grass-roots organizing, which doesn’t cost anything because it’s all volunteer-driven, it means you need a lot less money.

And that’s why I feel so strongly about this precinct-based stuff. If you think it’s going to be nothing but media, then the be-all and the end-all is raising every nickel that you can. And I think that’s unfortunate, frankly.