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Todd Thaxton

Todd Thaxton is the director of development in the biological sciences department of the University of California, San Diego. He was a deputy finance director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee from 1999 to 2000, where he worked under then-Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt. Thaxton was a volunteer fundraiser for Gephardt’s 2004 presidential campaign.

Josh Israel interviewed Thaxton on June 15, 2007.

What was your first campaign, and what got you involved?

I got involved in a local school-bond measure. I worked as a field director. This was in ’98. So that was my first exposure to an actual campaign, getting people to rally around an issue. This was a critical issue to pass a school bond so that schools could be refurbished. And some of them were in really bad shape. So a lot of kids were in trailers instead of classrooms. There was also the safety issue. In case of an emergency, there was no way for the principal to be able to communicate with different classrooms then. With the tragedies at Virginia Tech, we all know how critical it is for a campus to have some sort of emergency response, which now I think they have been able to implement, because the bond measure was successfully passed.

And what community was this?

This was east of Los Angeles. So it was a fairly lower-, middle-class community, a lot of hardworking people who cared a great deal about their kids’ education. So it was very fortunate that this passed.

From there you went to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee?

From there, my first exposure was actually interning in Senator [Ted] Kennedy’s office. There I got a great opportunity to learn about the legislative process and about the issues that the senator cares about: patients’ bill of rights, increasing the minimum wage, all of these issues that still, to this day, he works very hard for. So that was my first exposure.

After the school-bond measure campaign, I worked on a congressional race, which we lost. I worked there as a field director. Then I went back to Washington to intern again. I started interning, also, in Senator [Barbara] Boxer’s office, in the Los Angeles office. So that gave me the opportunity to see a Senate office from the more constituent-based type of activity, which is what the local office is focused on. The D.C. office focuses on legislation; the local offices focus on serving the constituents. And that’s one thing that Senator Boxer has been very good [at], especially in a state that, up to that point, had faced so many disasters with brushfires, earthquakes, floods. So it was very important to her to be very much in touch with her constituents.

So from working in Senator Boxer’s office and then Senator Kennedy’s office, and with the experience of a couple of campaigns under your belt, you came to the DCCC as a fundraiser?

I went to Washington in ’99 because I wanted to work on a presidential race. So I was looking for those opportunities. I interviewed at the DCCC. I knew someone who knew Noah Mamet [the DCCC’s national finance director] and had a meeting with him. He looked up my résumé, and he thought I would be a good match for the DCCC. So we kept interviewing, and I was fortunate to be hired there as deputy finance director for the Northeast.

Was this the first time you really were raising money?

It was the first time. The two congressional races that I had worked on, we lost them because we didn’t have enough resources. So I felt, “Well, I have been working with volunteers, setting up phone banks, organizing people to go on precinct walks.” I thought, “Well, this would be a great opportunity to see how I can contribute with my skills.” I thought: “Fundraising is really where we need to [work]; we are losing races because we are not spending enough money. We do not have enough money to get our message out there.”

In particular, there was a key race that I worked on in ’98. [Representative] Jane Harman had stepped down to run for governor, so that was an open seat. At the time that district was one of those districts that could go either way. It was, perhaps, actually a little more conservative. We had a very good candidate, and we lost it, essentially because we didn’t have enough money to get the message out there — in particular, to create an absentee-ballot program. A lot of Republicans have a very fine-tuned machine when it comes to absentee votes. So before even Election Day rolls around, they already have contacted their voters, mailed them ballots, and secured their votes, which on Election Day, if it’s going to be a close race, can make a big difference.

This has implications for the presidential race, too? Same kind of issues and the same people that you are trying to turn out, I would imagine, in presidential years?

Yes. What that means is that, at least in California, you have to apply for an absentee ballot, but you have to get it and then mail it in by a certain date, which is maybe a few weeks before the election. Of course, you can always walk your ballot to the box. But if you are doing an absentee vote, your whole point is not to go on Election Day.

But what that entails is that as a voter, you have to be completely sold on that candidate way before Election Day, maybe even by Labor Day or a little bit after Labor Day. So that means that you have to get mail pieces. You have to see ads. And that’s costly. It’s very costly. Then we also have to convince you that, where if you are traditionally an absentee-ballot voter, that we have to convince you to do it again.

And from this you had the opportunity to work with Congressman Gephardt?

Congressman Gephardt and a lot of other members: Congressman [Charles] Rangel, Congressman Patrick Kennedy. At the DCCC in 2000, we were very convinced that we were going to take the House back. A lot of members were very excited. And the DCCC was sort of coming into its own as a force to recruit the best candidates, to help campaign, and to also assist those races that are in most need, for both members. So it’s kind of a member-protection program, and also for newly recruited candidates.

After working with Congressman Gephardt, you decided to help him with his 2004 race?

Yes. I left Washington; I left politics altogether. But then as a volunteer, I always really liked Congressman Gephardt. And I still believe that he would have made a fantastic president. So I went to work on a volunteer capacity to help him in 2004.

And you raised money for his campaign in 2004?

People who I thought were like-minded, people who I thought were going to be interested in his message but maybe didn’t know enough about him or had not had enough exposure to him, I forwarded them to staff who then followed up. Then they closed a commitment.

So you were sort of doing the prospecting?

In essence, yes. If I met someone who I thought would resonate with the kind of campaign message that Dick was putting together, which I believe was that we all have the opportunity to participate in politics, and that it is important to solve a lot of these national issues, education among them being one of the most important, because in some way, we are all connected. If we are not education people, then ultimately we are not going to have the work force that we need in order to compete in a very highly advanced, technological global economy.

Looking at trade, for instance, if those in other countries are not getting paid fair wages, that’s going to ultimately resonate. It’s going to ultimately have a negative impact on our country as well. So what I would do is, if I met people through my other job and in my other roles as an individual, I would meet a lot of different types of people. I certainly referred friends and colleagues and anyone I could think of to Noah, so that Noah could do the appropriate follow-up to secure contributions or answer other questions if they had questions that I couldn’t answer.

How did doing this at a presidential level differ from doing it for a congressional candidate or for the DCCC?

Ultimately, it wasn’t that different from field, because you are canvassing people. You are talking to them about a message. You are trying to find out if they are interested in hearing more about it. If they want to talk to a candidate, there are events where they can go and meet the candidate. Dick did very well on debates, so he was a very solid performer in that sense. It was something that people were somewhat easily convinced.

[It was] different certainly from a DCCC, because at the time, campaign-finance reform hadn’t been passed, so for the DCCC there was soft money, which had no limits. Then, of course, there was the federal money, which had certain limits. And, of course, in a federal race, such as a congressional race or presidential, you had, at the time, a $1,000 primary maximum, in 2000, and then $2,000 [total] for the election.

Was it different trying to raise money in the post-McCain-Feingold world? Did it change things much? Or was it just that the amounts were different?

The amounts were different. But it was different. I think if I had stayed at the DCCC it would have been a better analogy, because they could raise the soft money, and then after campaign-finance [reform] they couldn’t raise soft money. So I think for them, it was the real kind of shift.

Presidential candidates never could raise soft money. So it wasn’t as much of a change?

It wasn’t. But ultimately, and what we see today, it’s really more about doing the kinds of things that I did; people have to think about who else could they engage with their neighbors, colleagues, business acquaintances. So it’s really much more about opening up your own personal contact list and seeing who you can engage. Soft money, it doesn’t exist anymore, at least in that shape. But it still is very much there, because other organizations can raise, still, unlimited amounts.

You mean 527s and groups like that?

Yes. What campaign-finance [reform] did was [that] it simply kind of changed the structure of the game. But the game is still the same. People are still raising unlimited amounts. The benefit before was that when it went through the party, it was all reported to the FEC [Federal Election Commission]. It was closely tracked. I am not so sure now, because there are so many of these organizations; it’s much more difficult to track. Anyone can create their own 527 and get contributions of $20 million. That’s not even examined anymore.

Whereas before, when it went through the parties, companies at least didn’t want the appearance. Even if they could, they wouldn’t contribute $10 million, because it was too much money. However, one thing that I did see during my time at the DCCC was that the figures were getting higher and higher, that $100,000 was a good-sized contribution. By the end, we were asking for $250,000. So, of course, the Republicans have been doing this for years. They had giving levels of $250,000 and $500,000 and $1 million. I think if campaign-finance [reform] had not occurred, they probably would have $2 [million], $3 [million], $4 [million], and $5 million. So in a way the structure hasn’t really changed.

The price tag just gets higher and higher.

The price tag would have gotten higher and higher. Yes.

In your time working on the congressional level and the presidential level, did you ever see quid pro quos of any kind? Did donors ever ask for some kind of special favor in exchange for their donations? Did you see anything like that? Is that common, in your experience?

Actually, it isn’t. It is so difficult. If you have ever studied politics and how a bill gets passed — I am sure everyone has studied in their political-science class or government class in high school or college — it is actually very complicated. So for a donor to come to a member and say, “Here is $5,000 — put this item in the bill,” is very, very difficult. I really didn’t see that.

Probably $5,000 would be such a small contribution these days.

But even if it was $5 million, it’s very, very difficult. You are seeing that with immigration. You are seeing that it is difficult to mobilize legislation that way. I think Democrats, if anything, are less affected by that because the issues that Democrats care about are issues that affect the working class. So there are, really, no big-business interests behind raising the minimum wage. There are other very big, powerful business interests that are fighting, and they probably go to the Republicans more than they would come to Democrats.

But no, I never saw any kind of request for a quid pro quo. It was really not about that. I think people wanted to contribute because they wanted to be on the side of the winning group. At the time, there was a lot of evidence that Democrats were going to take back the House.

Do you think it’s an ideological thing that they want to be on the side of the winning group? Or just they want to be friendly with the people in power?

They want to be friendly with the people in power. It is a mix. I don’t think there is any one aspect. But they want to be friendly with those in power. Ideologically they are aligned; there are people who certainly have a strong belief, and still do, on the issues that Democrats care about: the environment, education, working families, and health care. So there are people who really want to see a positive change for their country. This is why they are participating.

I would imagine it’s probably a similar rationale for people in different parties with different ideologies?

Sure. I would imagine that’s the case.

You were at the DCCC, which is a congressional campaign committee. Its focus is on electing Democrats to the U.S. House. But you were there in a presidential year: 2000. What kind of coordination does a group like the DCCC or the DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee] play with the presidential campaign? How are their fortunes and processes sort of tied together? It would have been the Gore campaign at that point.

I think the coordination would have been on the political sides of those who worked on their political aspect. Then I worked on the fundraising side. So the political people would have been, maybe, more knowledgeable of any coordination.

That would be more the managing. But I mean did the committees work together on fundraising?

The DSCC and the DCCC did have a “Majority 2000 Committee” that joined in that, so people could contribute. A majority went for the Senate and for their efforts to make Tom Daschle the Senate leader. The other half was for the House. In terms of the presidential [campaign] with Al Gore, to my knowledge, there really wasn’t that much or any coordination.

Was there coordination with the DNC?

There was something called “unity,” which was a strategy to raise money that would be split three ways. I kind of remember that. I think they had done that in ’96; I wasn’t there at that time. But most of the time we kind of did our own events separate from anything else that was going on.

But I think also that depends on the candidate. It depends on what that candidate wants. I think Al Gore was so focused on getting elected, I am not so sure. It really takes someone who is focused not just on getting elected, but also on seeing the majority in the Congress and having, maybe, the foresight to know that they want to have a Democratic Congress that they can work with and get legislation passed. But oftentimes in a presidential race, especially like the race in 2000, it was such a tight race, so hard-fought, that you probably only have time to focus on one aspect rather than several.

But the groups can communicate between each other? They can coordinate a message and processes? Unlike, say, a 527, which is legally prevented from talking to a campaign, the DCCC could have a conversation and arrange not to have a fundraiser in the same city at the same time or something like that?

Yes. For example, Al Gore did an event for the DCCC. I think he did a couple of events. He did one in Tennessee and another one in New York.

During 2000?

During 2000. So what would happen is we set up a special account. So, for example, for the majority fund it was an account that had to get set up that if you contributed, 50 percent this would be written down on the stub of wherever you write your contribution; you get a receipt that shows that. That half and half will go to both committees. We also had similar arrangements with the state parties. For example, in Texas there was a sort of bylaw that any money raised in Texas, a percentage of it stays with the Texas Democratic Party. So there were other kinds of arrangements that were similar.

That’s interesting. Having been through this all and having seen the money-raising before and after McCain-Feingold as a volunteer and as a professional, and on the congressional and the presidential level, do you think the system is working, as it is right now?

In some ways it is. If we look to Obama, for instance, he has been able to raise so much money to get his message out through people like you and I. And, of course, I am not contributing to him. I am not supporting his efforts.

Not that you have specifically, but people have.

People like us. People out of college. Anyone can contribute $5, $10 through the Internet. So that gives a voice to those who want to support their candidate. The Internet certainly has changed the landscape, and perhaps made it even more democratic than before. Before, it was those who could contribute $500,000 at events, and not everyone can do that. But I have heard of events that have been organized where people give $50 or $10. And they send one person to the event for something like that, too.

So in some ways it’s become more democratic. In other ways, we still have the problem that really was never addressed. And that’s the soft money. There is no soft money. But these 527 things are out there. They are still unlimited amounts, and we don’t know necessarily who is contributing. All of that information is not as closely tracked. As a society, we rely on groups like yours and others who track contributions. We try to investigate. But I am sure it takes quite a bit of unearthing a lot of documents.

Ultimately, the issue with campaign finance is the cost. Why do people have to raise so much money? It’s not because they want to sit there and spend their time raising money. I think a lot of candidates would rather be out there looking for votes, talking to voters, holding town-hall meetings. That’s what we have seen in the presidential race; they would want to do more of that. But we have a system that, if you want get your message out, you have to be on television and in places like California or New York. It’s very expensive. If you want to have an ad in New York, you would be reaching three or four states. But you are spending millions of dollars for a weekend, let alone a long campaign of 10 months or even three to six months if you have ads for a short time.

So the problem is still the cost. No one has really done anything to address the cost. Why does it have to cost so much to have an ad? We own the airwaves. Why can’t we allocate some time to candidates for political purposes? It’s a question that we really have not addressed. We try to cap contributions. But the need is still there. So until we address the reason we have to raise so much money, I am not sure that we are really solving the problem.