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Vincent Fry

Vincent Fry is the director of public affairs for the Caraway Group, a Washington-based communications and public relations firm. He was an associate director of political affairs at the White House (1999–2000) and was the director of the Democratic National Committee’s Voting Rights Institute in 2004.

Josh Israel interviewed Fry on August 10, 2007.

Would you talk a little bit about your background? You started at the White House in what year?

I started at the White House as an intern in the summer of 1999.

And you liked it?

I enjoyed it very much. It was one of the most rewarding experiences I have ever had.

And they kept you on?

They kept me on. I decided to defer my final year of law school to stay on.

And you were in the political affairs office?

That is correct. I originally started out as an operations manager of sorts. I was responsible for keeping some of the trains moving on time, making sure a number of the projects that were necessary for the smooth operation of our office got taken care of. And then I became the assistant to the political director, Minyon Moore, after her assistant went to work on Vice President [Al] Gore’s campaign for president.

And from there you went to the Democratic National Committee?

From there I went back to law school. I finished law school. I deferred law school for a year to do the White House. And then I went back to law school to finish that. And then I did some local political campaigns in Chicago. Then I went to the DNC.

And there you were the director of the Voting Rights Institute?

I started as the Eastern political desk. And then became the Eastern and Southern political desk. And then I became the director of the Voting Rights Institute.

And now you are with the Caraway Group?

Correct. It’s a strategic communications firm in Washington, D.C., woman- and African-American owned, in the practice area of public relations, public affairs, and diversity counseling.

So you have seen this town from a lot of different angles?

Yes.

In just seven, eight years?

Yes.

First off, let’s, if you would, start with the White House political affairs office. A lot of people hear this term and sort of associate the White House with political affairs. But can you talk a little bit about what the political affairs office does, what its role is within the administration?

Sure. I believe the political affairs department was started by President Ronald Reagan. And when you work in a White House administration or presidential administration, you represent every citizen in the country. And so you are really a government employee. Up until the political affairs department was formed, there were no opportunities for an administration to engage in any forms of political work.

What President Reagan did was — I believe it was Reagan — he created the office that would allow him to engage in some political activity, in the political process. And that is the current law: You are not supposed to be engaging in politics on government time. But there is a carve-out. [It] was introduced by those people to give the president an opportunity to sort of link between the government duty and some of the political work that happens. So essentially, the political affairs office is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the administration with those of the political party.

And the time you were there, the president was not up for reelection?

Correct.

Had no future office in mind or at least no immediate future office in mind? I suppose he could run for school board or something.

As far as I know. He was done with being [a candidate for] president of the United States.

So what kind of things did the political affairs office do?

Mostly we made sure that all of the constituency groups, or people who had supported us, or people who had opposed us, had a voice. That was really the most important thing, that the president be in a position to get outside advice from supporters and opponents. In the White House there can be a situation where you can get kind of insulated. And so I think the primary role of political affairs is just to give the president a sense of what’s going on in the country.

Does the political affairs office deal with a lot of the people who have donated or raised money for the campaigns?

They deal with it insofar as they have a place — when you think about how the presidency operates, the president is also the leader of the political party. And so what happens in a political affairs office is, they coordinate things with the national party. So the national party still represents the primary political arm of a political party. And that doesn’t change. But now you have a situation where it’s possible for the president and the administration to have a conversation with the national party.

And would you say that money buys access in an area like this?

In my experience, I wouldn’t say that money buys access. What I would say is that it gives people an opportunity to express a preference. I think that’s really what it gives. I mean, if you talk to most elected officials, it is [clear] they’re honest and nonbiased, and they want to represent the people they were elected to serve. And in my experience, that’s true by and large, with a few exceptions.

I think, as part of our system, again, money represents speech. And it gives a person a way to voice a particular position. But there are so many different individuals and businesses and things who give money for one reason or another. It’s virtually impossible to satisfy them all. And so if you govern based on someone giving you money, then you will always be in contrast, or your views will always be contradictory. It’s impossible to do that.

Unless you have a whole lot of positions on the same issue.

Well, it’s just impossible. Yes. It’s just impossible in general, right. I can appreciate how some people would think that money would influence politics. I mean it influences politics in the same way that speech does. And so money just gives certain people a bigger voice. But that doesn’t make, necessarily, the position one that makes sense for the country, as a policy matter.

Now after the 2000 election, you started at the DNC when?

In 2003.

So you were pretty much there for the 2003-2004 presidential cycle?

Correct. Yes.

And when did you start with the Voting Rights Institute?

I started at the Voting Rights Institute in, I believe it was, the beginning of 2004.

And you were there for the election?

Correct.

Can you talk a bit about, first of all, what the Voting Rights Institute is, how long it’s been around, and its role in the DNC?

The Voting Rights Institute was formed after the chaos around the 2000 election. There was a decision made that presidential elections are too important to leave to chance. And that message was brought home. We had a margin of victory of under a thousand votes decided the direction of the country. And so it was formed as a way to track and to think about policy and to think about ways to ensure that our electoral system works.

And was Maynard Jackson, the mayor of Atlanta, the first chair?

He was, yes.

And then Donna Brazile?

Correct.

And she is still chair?

Correct.

And when you were there, she was the chair?

When I was there, she was the chair, yes.

And so having seen the prism of the 2000 election, you had this portion of the DNC created from that. What sort of things did you do in the 2004 election to try and ensure that 2000 didn’t repeat itself?

Well, the first thing we wanted to do was, we wanted to begin to educate voters about the process, in general. We wanted to make sure that voters knew where their polling locations were. We wanted to make sure that they understood the types of machines they would be voting on. We wanted to give them a sense of what kinds of intimidation might occur. And then we wanted to make sure that we were in the polls on Election Day, just in case something happened or to prevent any occurrences of intimidation or fraud or any sort of thing like that.

[If you] just essentially take what is already an imperfect system and shine a bit more light on it so that once people have a greater awareness of what can happen, then people tend to be more careful in the process. So just to make sure that things ran smoother, that we reduced the potential for errors through the process.

And how did that work?

I think, like anything, change is incremental. And I think you had to make a decision, for one, to do better and change. And once you make that decision, it’s just a step-by-step process to getting there. So I think 2004 was better than 2000, because more people were aware of what was going on out there. I don’t know that the outcome — as a Democrat, obviously, my preference was for John Kerry — but in terms of the process, I think it was clearer to most people. And it’s going to take some time, as I think we have seen. But I was pleased that at least we made a decision to start paying attention to the issue.

So you think 2004 was a more accurate election, a fairer election, than 2000?

Well, I don’t know that you can ever say that something was more accurate or more fair. I think one of the things that technology provides for us is it gives a larger section of the population more access to information, and that information informs decision-making. And I think that’s important.

Let’s say 40 years ago, if something were going on in Nebraska, no one would know about it unless a national newspaper organization wrote or did something on broadcast about it. With the Internet now, if something happens in Nebraska, everybody knows about it. And so then you are able to create a critical mass around the issue. And so I can’t speak to whether or not it was better. What I can say is, we have more information. And we are in a better position to address those issues sooner.

Were there things that you saw in 2004 that you didn’t expect that would be more likely to be things you’ll focus on in 2008? Or the Voting Rights Institute — I understand that you are not running it anymore — would likely have learned from 2004?

Well, I think the most important thing we learned is education and communication, getting it out there. It’s my sense that one of the goals of your project is to shed more light, to give more people more information. If people have more information, they can make more informed choices. And I think that was the most critical element in 2004. And I think as long as there are people who express a desire to make our electoral system work better, then nothing but good things can come of it.

The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. Just last year — I think it was last year — it was renewed for another 40 years. Where would you say the right to vote stands today?

I would say that the right to vote is considered fundamental, as with anything else. We have to be vigilant to ensure that the results reflect the spirit behind the initial legislation. And I think that’s the important thing. We all believe that the right to vote is important, and we simply have to put the resources behind the policy to ensure that the rhetoric matches our actions.

Did you see any abuses in 2004 of that right? And if so, what are some of the worst cases of voter suppression or intimidation or . . .?

Well, the interesting thing about voter intimidation and suppression is that it’s really an act of desperation and not inspiration. And people are generally more desperate when things appear to be closer. So if an election appears to be a landslide, you will almost never see that kind of sort of behavior activity. It’s when it’s close, and people aren’t quite sure, that they use, really, every sort of tool that they think is available to them.

The critical element about voter intimidation and suppression is that it really thrives in a low-tech environment. For example, it is very hard to know what a person’s intentions are. You can only look at the evidence and the facts. And generally, the fact that almost always comes to life in a voter intimidation or suppression environment are flyers that say if you have outstanding parking tickets or — that disinformation campaign: if you have warrants, don’t vote at the polls — or stationing police officers in sort of a threatening way around polling places. Those are the kinds of things that [are] very hard to tie down. There is not really a smoking gun.

If you were to put up a billboard that said something like that, there would be more of a trail.

Exactly.

People would know who paid for the billboard and all of that.

Exactly. And so that’s why these tactics are really more of an act of desperation. Because if they were an inspired choice, it could be rolled out in a broader, more overt way. And so they thrive in a low-tech environment. Just to give you an example of something that could happen, I don’t have any evidence to support this, but I think it is on record that there have been flyers around or hung on electric poles and things that say if you have outstanding warrants, that kind of thing. Well, see, that only relies on a person with $2,000 cash and a copy machine.

Right there, that’s a situation where low-tech is better, because the people you are speaking to are generally people who operate under the margins of the community anyway and don’t even have access or don’t quite understand or quite trust those systems anyway. And so the objective, in those cases, as far as I am concerned, is to affect outcomes incrementally.

I mean, looking at what happened in Ohio in 2004, where just 120,000 votes were the difference, with 100 million votes cast nationally, it’s not necessary that you create a situation where everybody can’t vote. You just need to make sure that there is an incremental amount of people who make a decision not to vote or can’t vote, because there is not enough attention paid to their voting process. Or you need a little bit of money to deter them. So actually, I would probably say that the biggest problem is less overt, and more sort of a benign kind of not putting in the resources sufficient to ensure that there are enough machines available, that workers are trained, that kind of thing.

So it sounds like you are saying that as expensive as campaigns are becoming, with candidates raising tens of millions of dollars already at this point in the cycle, the area of voter intimidation and suppression is actually not really a big money-costing process?

Yes.

It’s actually something the can be probably be done pretty cheaply.

Yes. And not only cheaply, but off of the radar. If the goal was to make small, incremental differences, then you can target that, in a way. I’ll give you another example. When you look at how campaigns are managed and all of the money that’s being spent, invariably, at the end of a campaign a candidate might have or a committee might have an extra $10,000 available that they have got to get rid of. They don’t want to be sitting on “X” number of millions of dollars after the campaign. So what they do is they think, where can I spend this $10,000 in a way that will show that I have used the money? It may have some effect, but I can do it quickly. So generally, that might be radio, right? I mean, you can buy some radio or some autocalls, that kind of thing.

The same situation could happen with the flyers. Someone has got $10,000 cash and they want to use it to be helpful. You are not really sure where you are. The race is close. Nobody can really trace that. And so I think it thrives in a low-dollar environment, because fewer people are paying attention. If you run a thousand-point ad on television, “Don’t go to the polls . . .”

People would notice.

Right. And you would be hitting a bunch of people that you are not even targeting.

You want to speak to the people. And those people are not likely watching the broadcast news at five, six, and 10 [o’clock]. They are probably in their community shopping or doing something like that. So you want to target communications where people are going to see it. So I actually think that voter intimidation and suppression really sort of thrive in a low-dollar environment in a desperate moment.

The Republican National Committee, in the ’80s, on a couple of occasions entered into a consent decree with the Democratic Party pledging not to engage in voter intimidation and suppression tactics in the future. Is it your sense that the parties follow this?

One of the things that you have to keep in mind about the party structure is that there is a lot of turnover. And with any institution, one of the things that make the institution stronger is sort of the institutional knowledge that goes with it. And so I think, in the case of Republicans, for them, any sort of voter intimidation or suppression, generally, benefits them. So, from my standpoint, there is no real incentive [for them] to work very hard to change that for the better.

I mean, I can’t speak to whether or not the Republican Party overtly — I know what they agreed to in their consent decrees. And they acknowledged that they were engaged in some inappropriate conduct. But going forward, I can’t say that that’s what they are doing. But again, it’s such a very simple tactic that there is no requirement for coordination, I mean, as long as there is a continuing debate about the tactics and some enterprising person on the campaign [can] say, “I know what I’ll do.”

Or even an enterprising person who is not part of the campaign?

Exactly. I mean the interesting thing about the techniques and the tactics is that they are available to anyone. And so there is no real requirement. If you go back, say, 20, 30 years ago, there was probably more of a concerted effort, which is why they agreed to the consent decree to stop doing these things. But once it becomes part of the sort of the public purview, then once it’s out there, it’s out there.

Do you think it’s more likely or more often a person “X” for Congress that has $10,000 extra at the end of a campaign decides to do this? Or supporter of person “X” deciding: “I really want to make a difference in this race. I am going to spend $10,000 of my money or $100 of my money.”

It’s such a personal decision — a supporter. I mean, the average candidate knows that this is bad. It’s not from a value standpoint, just from a public perception standpoint. They know this is bad. And so again, there can be instances in campaigns where someone is just willing — a supporter, or it could be a person who wants to give the impression it could be a smokescreen, for example. The candidate himself could do it, or an opponent could do it to give the impression that the candidate did it. So it’s really just a tool in the campaign tool kit. And it’s a blunt instrument because, at the right time, with all of these other things going on, it’s just very difficult to detect the source.

Generally speaking, when Democrats talk about the biggest problems with elections, they talk about voter suppression and guaranteeing the right to vote, whereas, generally, Republicans focus more on the issue of voter fraud. And I guess that would be people voting twice, or people who are not legally able to be voters voting, people voting on behalf of those who are deceased, and so forth. How real a problem do you think that is?

Again, this is an imperfect system. So there are examples of both types. The problem that I have with the Republican position is that they haven’t produced a substantial amount of data to even support that contention. It’s all hypothetical. For example, in the 2004 election they said, “Well, somebody registered or signed up as Mickey Mouse.” Well, Mickey Mouse didn’t show up at the polls. And so in those kinds of things, it’s really a situation, I think, where there are arguments to be made on both sides.

But the Democrats have provided ample support, including that consent decree. I mean that’s an acknowledgment of wrongdoing. And there are cases here and there where somebody bought votes. And that’s part of an imperfect system, but it is not outcome-determinant. And I think that’s the thing that’s different about this. And so again, I feel like real or perceived voter intimidation or suppression benefit Republicans.

So at this point, there is no real need for them to overtly do anything. It’s just the mere suggestion that has sort of a detrimental effect on potential voters. Whereas the fraud issue, it’s so rare, you haven’t seen a single report by Republicans on all of these fraudulent things that have occurred. A smattering, but the DNC put out a huge report after Ohio. There is tons of independent data which would suggest that intimidation does happen.

And the Help America Vote Act of, I guess it was, 2002. What impact did it have as far as these issues?

It forces elected officials to look at this issue in a serious way and act on it. Again, one of the benefits of a free and open society that encourages debate is that if you have a strong argument, and you can encourage people to support it, then you are in a position to affect policy change. And so all of these incremental steps, the Help America Vote Act, with the DNC taking a more aggressive action, it’s really just a way to bring it to the forefront of people’s minds so that we pay more attention and that we take it seriously. How you spend your money determines your priorities. You know that. And so what the country has determined is that it’s a priority to have free and clear elections. And so that’s how we are spending our money. I think it’s a great thing.

And if you could take another incremental step, or even an enormous all-encompassing step to change things for the better in this area, legally, what do you think that would be?

I think the current legislation that was introduced in the Senate by the Count Every Vote, I believe it is, by Senator [Hillary] Clinton and some others, I think [Representative] Stephanie Tubbs Jones as well, I think that’s a good step. Nationalized Election Day. You want to make it easier for people to vote. That’s really the objective here. You don’t want to put up unnecessary obstacles to voting. So anything that makes it easier for citizens to cast a ballot, I think, is important.

We want to encourage participation, not create obstacles. And I think that’s the fundamental difference between the conversation that the Democrats are having and the conversation that the Republicans are having. The Democrats are saying, “Can we get as many people participating in this democracy as possible?” And the Republicans are saying, “No, let’s make sure we have the right people.”